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 While the theoretical and empirical finance literature 
has focused almost exclusively on enterprise credit, about 
half of credit extended by banks to the private sector in 
a sample of 45 developing and developed countries is to 
households. The share of household credit in total credit 
increases as countries grow richer and financial systems 
develop. Cross-country regressions, however, suggest a 
positive and significant impact on gross domestic product 
per capita growth only of enterprise but not household 
credit. These two findings together partly explain why 
This paper—a product of the Finance and Private Sector Team, Development Research Group—is part of a larger effort 
in the department to understand the consequences and determinants of financial sector development. Policy Research 
Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at T.Beck@uvt.
nl, frioja@gsu.edu, or nvalev@gsu.edu. 
previous studies have found a small or insignificant 
effect of finance on growth in high-income countries.  In 
addition, countries with a lower share of manufacturing, 
a higher degree of urbanization, and more market-
oriented financial systems have a higher share of 
household credit. It is thus mostly socio-economic 
trends that determine credit composition, while policies 
influencing banking market structure and regulatory 
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The theoretical and empirical finance literature has focused on enterprise credit.  Most theoretical 
models with endogenous financial intermediation focus on an enterprise in need of external 
finance for investment or production purposes (see Levine, 2005 for an overview). The empirical 
finance and growth literature has been motivated by the observation of financing constraints for 
enterprises in many developing countries (McKinnon, 1973) and industry and firm-level data 
have been used to address the causality issue (Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt 
and Maksimovic, 2005).  Even the microfinance revolution started from the observation that lack 
of access to credit is the only constraint that holds poor entrepreneurs back (Armendariz de 
Aghion and Morduch, 2005).  
However, the focus on enterprise credit in both the theoretical and the empirical finance 
literature does not sit well with reality. Household credit is a major part of overall private sector 
credit in many countries and its importance has been increasing. For example, the share of credit 
to households as share of total credit has increased from 27 percent in 1980 to 58 percent in 2000 
in South Korea, from 12 percent to 56 percent in the U.K., and from 31 percent to 58 percent in 
Uruguay. During the period from 1994 to 2005, household credit was greater than firm credit in 
18 out of 45 countries for which data are available. What explains the cross-country variation in 
the share of firm and household credit?  Does the increasing importance of household credit have 
implications for the finance-growth link? 
This paper (i) documents the important role that private sector lending to households 
plays in many financial systems around the world, (ii) assesses whether bank lending to 
enterprises and households have independent impacts on GDP per capita growth, and (iii) relates 
the share of household in total credit to different socio-economic country characteristics as well 
as financial sector policies. First, we decompose a standard measure of financial development – 
claims of deposit money banks on the private domestic sector relative to GDP – into credit to 
enterprises and credit to households and document the variation of this decomposition across 
countries and over time.  Second, we assess whether measures of bank lending to enterprises and 
to households enter independently in standard OLS and IV cross-country growth regressions.  
Third, we use cross-country regressions to explore different country characteristics that can 
explain cross-country variation in the share of household credit.   Understanding cross-country variation in household and enterprise credit is important for 
several reasons. First, understanding the determinants and consequences of credit composition 
can have important repercussions for theory. If household credit has an independent impact on 
growth, this has repercussions for how theory should model the link between financial sector 
development and economic growth.  Second, decomposing overall bank lending into its 
components might help us understand why the effect of financial development on growth varies 
across countries at different levels of economic development and provide insights into the 
channels through which financial systems foster economic development.  Specifically, Aghion, 
Howitt, and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) and Rioja and Valev (2004 a,b) show that there are non-
linearieties between financial sector development and economic growth.  Finally, finding a 
differential impact of enterprise and household credit on growth can have important implications 
for policy makers who are interested in maximizing the growth effect of financial sector policies. 
While the corporate finance literature has focused on enterprise credit, the household 
finance literature has focused mostly on asset allocation decisions (Campbell, 2006).  Theory has 
shown how financial development allows enterprises to overcome financing constraints with 
positive repercussions for investment, innovation and economic growth.
1 Empirical studies have 
documented the link between financial market imperfections, firms’ financing constraints, firm 
growth and economy-wide growth.
2  Relaxing liquidity constraints on households and providing 
them with easier access to credit can result in lower excess sensitivity of household consumption 
to business cycle variations (Jappelli and Pagano, 1989; Bacchetta and Gerlach, 1997; 
Ludvigson, 1999).  While household credit might thus help households to smooth out their 
consumption and potentially lead to welfare improvements, theory provides ambiguous 
predictions about the effect of household credit on economic growth. While Jappelli and Pagano 
(1994) show that alleviating credit constraints on households reduces the savings rate, with 
negative repercussions for economic growth, Galor and Zeira (1993) and De Gregorio (1996) 
show that household credit can foster economic development if it increases human capital 
accumulation.  Specifically, Jappelli and Pagano (1994) show for a sample of 25 middle- and 
high-income countries that lower liquidity constraints on households, proxied by the loan-to-
value ratio for mortgages, are associated with a lower savings rate and lower GDP per capita 
                                                 
1 See, among others, Boyd and Prescott (1986), Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) and King and Levine (1993). 
2 See, for example, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), Rajan and Zingales (1998), Love (2003), Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2005). 
 
 
1growth, while De Gregorio (1996) shows for a sample of 20 OECD countries that higher loan-to-
value ratios are associated with higher secondary school enrolment, but not with economic 
growth.
 3  Both theory and previous empirical work thus provide ambiguous predictions, with the 
effect of household credit on economic growth mainly depending on the use of the credit.  
Unlike our paper, most previous empirical work has been limited to OECD countries.   
Theory also provides little guidance regarding which factors should drive the 
composition of credit to the private sector.
4 We therefore relate our analysis of cross-country 
variation in the share of household credit to the basic analytics of credit provision by financial 
institutions – economizing on transaction costs and improving risk management (Diamond 1984, 
Ramakrishnan and Thakor 1984, Boyd and Prescott 1986, Williamson 1986, Allen 1990, among 
many others). Household loans are typically of smaller size and households typically are harder 
to evaluate and have less collateral to offer, so that both transaction costs and information 
asymmetries constitute a higher hurdle. In our cross-country analysis, we will therefore relate 
different country characteristics to the degree to which financial institutions can overcome these 
market frictions.  
Analyzing credit composition across countries and over time shows that the share of 
household credit increases as countries develop economically and financially. Cross-country 
regressions with data averaged over 1994 to 2005 suggest, however, that only bank lending to 
enterprises, but not to households, is linked to GDP per capita growth.  The increasing 
importance of household credit for higher-income countries and its insignificance in growth 
regressions can explain the non-linear relationship of overall financial development with 
economic growth documented by other studies.  Exploring country characteristics related to 
credit composition shows that the share of household credit is related both to demand and 
supply-side constraints, but not to banking market structure or regulatory policies. Specifically, 
the share of household credit is higher in more urban societies and in countries with smaller 
manufacturing sectors. Market-based financial systems where firms can access alternative 
                                                 
3 The literature using micro-level data on household credit also provides ambiguous results. Karlan and Zinman 
(2006) find a positive effect, while Coleman (1999) finds no effect of microcredit on households’ welfare in South 
Africa and Thailand, respectively. 
4 While Jappelli and Pagano (1989) discuss the determinants of consumer debt, rather than the composition of 
credit, they provide useful discussion on some supply and demand side factors of consumer credit. On the supply 
side, they concentrate on interest spreads and on indicators of credit rationing and on the demand side, on tax 




2financing sources through capital markets have a higher share of household credit.  While overall 
institutional development is positively correlated with the share of household credit in total 
credit, effective contract enforcement is negatively associated with the household credit share. 
Once we control for legal origin and the religious composition of countries, however, the 
correlation with institutional development and legal system efficiency turns insignificant. 
This paper is related to a large body of literature on finance and growth, as surveyed by 
Levine (2005). Aghion, Howitt, and Mayer-Foulkes (2005), however, provide theoretical and 
empirical evidence that financial sector development helps countries catch up to the productivity 
and thus income level of high-income countries, while it is not related to growth in high-income 
countries.  Along similar lines, Rioja and Valev (2004a,b) show that financial sector 
development has a strong growth effect for middle-income, but a smaller effect in high-income 
countries. Neither of these papers, however, has considered the composition of credit.
5  This 
paper is the first to assess the independent impact of firm and household credit on economic 
growth across a broad sample of countries.  
This paper is also related to the literature on the determinants of financial sector 
development.  Researchers have focused on macroeconomic stability, legal system efficiency 
and the information framework as explaining cross-country variation in financial sector 
development (Boyd, Levine and Smith, 2001; Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer, 2007; Beck, 
2006). Market and ownership structure have also been related to cross-country variation in 
financial sector development (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2002; Demirguc-Kunt, 
Laeven, Levine, 2004; Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2001). Finally, bank regulatory 
and supervisory approaches have been shown to be critically linked to differences in financial 
sector development (Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2006, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 
2006; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2006).  This paper assesses whether these different 
policies have a differential impact on enterprise vs. household credit.  
This paper is a first attempt at understanding the composition of bank lending across 
countries and is therefore subject to several caveats. First, the definition of household vs. firm 
credit is not homogenous across countries and our variable is therefore subject to measurement 
error. Further, a strict separation into firm and household credit might not be possible in the case 
                                                 
5 Buyukkarabacak and Krause (2005) show that a higher share of credit to households in total credit is associated 
with higher trade deficits, while Buyukkarabacak and Valev (2006) show that firm and household credit growth 
enter individually and separately into banking crisis prediction models. 
 
 
3of proprietorships. Second, cross-country regressions are subject to the usual biases of 
endogeneity and simultaneity.  While in the growth regressions we control for these biases by 
employing instrumental variables, our estimations of credit composition across countries do not 
control for endogeneity and we therefore do not interpret the findings as causal relationships. 
Finally, due to data constraints, we focus on bank lending to households and ignore lending to 
households by non-financial institutions, an increasing phenomenon in many high- and middle-
income countries.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the construction 
of our main variable of interest. Section 3 presents the results from cross-country growth 
regressions when introducing separate measure of enterprise and household credit. Section 4 
explores country characteristics and policies associated with credit composition.  Section 5 
concludes.  
 
2.  Decomposing Bank Lending  
Standard financial sector indicators focus on the aggregate value of credit to the private sector by 
deposit money banks, but do not distinguish between lending to households and lending to firms. 
We compile data from national central bank reports, annual bulletins, and other statistical 
sources where disaggregated credit data are available. Our dataset includes 45 countries spanning 
different time periods depending on data availability but with a significant overlap during the 
period from 1994 to 2005. In order to avoid discrepancies between different countries we 
standardized our data collection methodology by focusing on the collection of data on credit to 
non-financial corporations and/or private enterprises/businesses by deposit money banks, where 
available. If private credit is reported for various economic sectors, we define business credit as 
the sum of loans to industry, construction, services, agriculture, and trade. We then use the credit 
series from the Financial Structure Database of Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2000) to 
obtain the distribution of credit into enterprise credit and household credit as the difference 
between overall credit and enterprise credit.   While we have annual data available, we will use 
mostly averages over the period 1994 to 2005.  
  Table 1 presents the large variation in overall banking sector development and the 
relative importance of enterprise and household credit across our 45 sample countries.  
Specifically, we present Bank Credit to GDP – total claims of deposit money banks on the 
 
 
4private sector as ratio of GDP - and its two components – Enterprise Credit to GDP and 
Household Credit to GDP. We also present the relative share of enterprise and household credit 
in total bank credit.  Whereas Bank Credit to GDP was 14% over the sample period in Russia, it 
was 160% in Switzerland.  Enterprise Credit to GDP varied from 9% in Argentina to 86% in 
Malaysia, while Household Credit to GDP varied from 3% in Russia to 99% in Switzerland.  
Whereas Canada, Denmark and the U.S. had a household credit share well over 70% of total 
bank credit during 1994-2005, the household credit share was 17% in Poland and Egypt and 10% 
in Malaysia during the same period.  
The correlations in Table 2 indicate that both Enterprise Credit to GDP and Household 
Credit to GDP are positively and significantly correlated with Bank Credit to GDP.  As banking 
sectors develop, however, the share of household credit increases, as can be seen from the 
positive and significant correlation of Household Credit Share with Bank Credit to GDP.  
Similarly, while economically more developed countries have higher ratios of both enterprise 
and household credit to GDP, the relative importance of household credit increases.  
Economic development can influence the provision of household credit both through the 
supply and demand channels. On the one hand, rising incomes will allow a larger share of 
households to overcome the threshold of minimum loan size for consumer and mortgage loans 
(Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Martinez Peria, 2007). On the other hand, the cost of financial 
service provision declines with economic development (Harrison, Sussman and Zeira, 1999). 
Both trends should increase the share of household credit in total bank lending. Figures 1 and 2 
illustrate the positive correlation between economic and banking sector development and the 
importance of household credit.   Specifically, we show the average Bank Credit to GDP ratios 
and the shares of household credit in total credit across three different groups of economic 
development. In particular, we divide countries into three groups, according to the 33
rd and the 
66
th percentile of GDP per capita in the sample. Bank Credit to GDP increases with GDP per 
capita, from 25% to 58% to 94%. We observe a similar pattern with regards to the share of 
household credit. Whereas household credit is 40% of total credit in the lowest third, it is 63% of 
total credit in the middle third of countries, and 72% in the richest third. Thus, the share of 
household credit is greater in countries that are more developed financially and economically.  
We also observe sizeable variation in the household credit share over time for the 
countries where historical disaggregated credit data are available. While most of the countries in 
 
 
5our sample experienced an increasing trend in the household credit share, there are some 
countries for which this increase was more pronounced. For example, in Iceland the share of 
household credit increased from 15% in 1985 to 50% in 2005, while South Korea also 
experienced a substantial increase in the household credit share from 35% to 60% in that same 
time period. For a sample of six countries (Iceland, Japan, Korea, Portugal, UK and US) for 
which we have longer time-series data, the share of household credit in total bank lending 
increased from 31.6% in 1980 to 55.4% in 2000, a trend that paralleled the increase in Bank 
Credit to GDP (Figure 2).  
 
3. Enterprise  vs.  Household  Lending – Does it Matter? 
This section assesses whether there is an independent impact of bank lending to enterprises and 
households on GDP per capita growth.  We will be utilizing standard OLS and IV cross-country 
growth regressions, introducing separate indicators of bank lending to enterprises as ratio to GDP 
and bank lending to households as ratio to GDP.  This section first discusses the methodology 
and set of conditioning information and then the main results.  
 
3.1 Methodology   
We run cross-country growth regressions to assess the impact of bank lending to enterprises and 
households on economic growth, averaged over the sample period 1994 to 2005.   
g(i) = [y(i,t) - y(i,t-1)]/11 =   α1 + β1Enterprise Credit to GDP(i) +  
+ β2Household Credit to GDP(i) + γ’C(i) + δy(i,t-1) + ε(i) 
where y(i) is log of real GDP per capita and C is a set of conditioning information.  The 
coefficients of interest are β1 and β2.  We run regressions where we force β1 = β2, thus 
replicating the standard finance and growth regression with the aggregate measure of Bank 
Credit to GDP, regressions with β1 =0, regressions with β2 =0 and regressions where we allow 
β1, β2 to enter independently.   
To assess the strength of the independent link between bank lending to enterprises and 
households and economic growth, we control for other potential determinants of economic 
growth in our regressions. Following the finance and growth literature, our set of conditioning 
information includes (i) the log of initial real GDP per capita to control for convergence, (ii) 
secondary school enrolment to control for human capital accumulation, (iii) the share of exports 
 
 
6and imports to GDP, (iv) the inflation rate and (v) the ratio of government expenditures to GDP.
6  
All data are averaged over the sample period 1994 to 2005, with the exception of initial GDP per 
capita, measured in 1994. We include most regressors, including Enterprise Credit to GDP and 
Household Credit to GDP in logs, to take account of potential non-linearities in their relationship 
with GDP per capita growth. 
GDP per capita growth varied significantly across our sample over the period 1994 to 
2005, ranging from -0.6% in Russia to 5.5% in Korea.  While it is positively correlated with 
Bank Credit to GDP only at the 12% significance level, its correlation with Enterprise Credit to 
GDP is positive and significant at the 1% level. There is no significant correlation of GDP per 
capita growth with Household Credit to GDP. 
OLS regressions suffer from several biases, including omitted variable, measurement and 
endogeneity biases.  We therefore use instrumental variable regressions to extract the exogenous 
components of bank lending to enterprises and households and relate them to GDP per capita 
growth.  Following the seminal work by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) who identified variation in 
countries' legal origin of countries as a historical exogenous factor explaining current variation in 
countries' level of financial development, an extensive literature has utilized this variable to 
extract the exogenous component of financial development.
7  Stulz and Williamson (2003), on 
the other hand, suggest religious composition as important driver of cross-country differences in 
financial development.
8  
Table 3 presents regressions of the logs of Enterprise Credit to GDP and Household 
Credit to GDP on the included exogenous variables from the second stage regressions, legal 
origin dummies and indicators of religious composition.  Specifically, we include dummy 
variables indicating British Common Law countries, French Civil Code countries, German Civil 
Code countries and Scandinavian Civil Code countries, with transition economies being the 
omitted category.  We include the share of population belonging to the Catholic, Muslim and 
Protestant denominations in 1980, with data from La Porta et al. (1999). 
                                                 
6 Similar sets of conditioning information were used by Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) and Beck and Levine 
(2004).  
7 Specifically, an extensive literature has discussed the empirical observation that British Common Law countries 
have better developed financial systems than French Civil Code countries, with German and Scandinavian Civil 
Code systems falling in between. As most countries acquired their legal system through colonization or occupation 
several centuries ago, legal origin can be considered an exogenous variable.   See Beck and Levine (2005) for an 
overview. 
8 Specifically, they show that countries with predominantly Protestant population have stronger creditor rights. 
 
 
7The Table 3 regressions suggest that the exogenous excluded variables – legal origin and 
religious composition – can jointly explain variation in both Enterprise Credit to GDP and 
Household Credit to GDP after controlling for the included exogenous variables.  Specifically, 
Catholic countries have lower levels of Enterprise Credit to GDP.  Also, British and French legal 
origin countries have significantly higher levels of Household Credit to GDP than the omitted 




The Table 4 results show a positive and significant relationship between enterprise credit and 
GDP per capita growth, but an insignificant relationship between household credit and GDP per 
capita growth. Columns 1 to 4 present simple OLS regression utilizing indicators of overall 
banking sector credit to GDP, enterprise credit to GDP and household credit to GDP controlling 
for an array of other country characteristics.  
The column 1 regression confirms the previous finding of a positive and significant 
relationship between banking sector development and GDP per capita growth. Bank Credit to 
GDP enters positively and significantly at the 5% level. The column 2 regression shows a 
positive and significant relationship between Enterprise Credit to GDP and GDP per capita 
growth, while the column 3 regression shows an insignificant relationship between Household 
Credit to GDP and GDP per capita growth.  When we include both Enterprise Credit to GDP and 
Household Credit to GDP, our findings are confirmed (column 4).
10 Among the variables in the 
set of conditioning information, only government consumption enters consistently with a 
negative and significant coefficient.  In unreported regressions, we confirm our findings in a 
smaller sample that excludes 13 transition economies. Throughout all of the analyses in this 
paper, we identify and assess the potential impact of outliers by following the methodology of 
                                                 
9 The results suggest that legal origin explains primarily the variation of enterprise credit whereas religious 
composition explains primarily the variation of household credit. This does not mean that Enterprise Credit to GDP 
does not vary across different legal families or that Household Credit to GDP does not vary across countries with 
different religious preferences.  Rather, these variables cannot explain residual variation in the two types of credit 
after controlling for initial GDP per capita and other country factors that we will include in the second stage 
regressions.   




8Besley, Kuh, and Welsch (1980).
11 For example, for regression (4) we identify Poland as outlier 
that might drive the finding on Enterprise Credit to GDP.  The results hold when excluding 
Poland from the analysis.  Even when excluding South Africa and Poland, two countries that 
might drive the insignificant result on Household Credit to GDP, our findings are confirmed.  
The effect of Enterprise Credit to GDP is not only statistically, but also economically 
significant.  Take Poland and the U.S., the countries at the 25
th and 75
th percentiles of Enterprise 
Credit to GDP.  The regression results in column 4 suggest that if Poland had the level of 
Enterprise Credit to GDP as the U.S., it would have grown 1.1 percentage points faster per year 
over the period 1994 to 2005.  This economic effect is almost identical to the economic effect of 
Bank Credit. Specifically, using the column 1 estimate and comparing Pakistan and Thailand, the 
countries at the 25
th and 75
th percentiles of Bank Credit to GDP, yields a similar effect of Bank 
Credit to GDP of 1.1 percentage points growth per year.  
The relationship between Enterprise Credit to GDP and GDP per capita growth is robust 
to controlling for endogeneity and simultaneity and measurement biases (column 5).  When 
instrumenting for both Enterprise and Household Credit to GDP with legal origin and religion, 
Enterprise Credit to GDP continues to enter positively and significantly. The Sargan test of 
overidentifying restrictions is not rejected, suggesting that legal origin and religious composition 
affect GDP per capita growth only through one of the explanatory variables. As reported in Table 
3, the first stage F-tests confirm the relevance of our excluded exogenous variables.
12  While 
subject to the usual caveats of cross-country instrumental variable regression – bias due to lagged 
dependent variable, potentially weak instruments and lack of instruments for other explanatory 
variables – these findings suggest that the relationship between Enterprise Credit to GDP and 
GDP per capita growth is not driven by endogeneity or simultaneity and measurement biases. 
                                                 
11 Specifically, we (i) compute the change in the coefficient on Enterprise Credit to GDP when the ith observation is 
omitted from the regression, (ii) scale the change by the estimated standard error of the coefficient, (iii) take the 
absolute value, and (iv) call the result Δβi. Then, we use the Besley, Kuh, and Welsch recommendation of a critical 
value of two, and identify those observations where abs (Δβi) > 2/sqrt (n), where abs(x) yields the absolute value of 
x, sqrt(x) yields the square root of x, and n represents the number of observations in the regression. 
12 We considered additional specification tests, available on request. Specifically, the Anderson canonical 
correlations likelihood ratio test of instrument relevance, Shea's partial R squares measure of instrument relevance 
and the Cragg-Donald test of weak instruments  provide evidence that both the legal origin and the religious 
composition variables are valid and relevant instruments.  Similar, we do not find that either the legal origin or the 
religious composition set of instrumental variables are redundant in the sense that including either set of 
instrumental variables improves the asymptotic efficiency of the estimation.  See Baum, Shaffer and Stillmann 




9The results in Table 4 suggest that only the component of private sector lending going to 
enterprises is robustly linked with economic growth, while bank lending to households is not.  
Given that the statistical and economic significance of Bank Credit to GDP and Enterprise Credit 
to GDP are almost the same, and that the R square increases when we use Enterprise Credit to 
GDP instead of Bank Credit to GDP, our results suggest that Enterprise Credit to GDP might be 
a better measure of the growth enhancing role of financial sectors than Bank Credit to GDP. Our 
results confirm theoretical predictions that financial institutions and markets foster economic 
growth through alleviating firms’ financing constraints.  They are consistent with the empirical 
finance and growth literature analyzing the relationship between financial sector development 
and firms’ financing constraints and growth.  They are also consistent with an ambiguous 
relationship between household credit and economic growth, with positive effects through 
human capital allocation and negative effects through dampening the savings rate canceling each 
other out.  
Several studies have found that the finance-growth link is much weaker or even non-
existent for high-income countries (Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes, 2005, Rioja and Valev, 
2004a,b).  Could the lack of significance of Household Credit to GDP in growth regressions and 
the positive correlation of the share of household credit in total credit with GDP per capita 
explain why the relationship between banking sector development and economic growth turns 
insignificant for high-income countries?   
The regressions in Table 5 show that Bank Credit to GDP is only significant for countries 
at or below the median of initial GDP per capita, while Enterprise Credit to GDP is significant at 
the 10% level up to the 75
th percentile of initial GDP per capita.  Here, we add interaction terms 
of Bank Credit to GDP (column 1), Enterprise Credit to GDP (column 2) and Household Credit 
to GDP (column 3) with the log of initial GDP per capita to assess whether there is a differential 
effect of banking sector development across different levels of economic development.  Further, 
we report the overall effect of banking sector development at different levels of initial GDP per 
capita.  The column 1 regression of Table 5 shows that the relationship between banking sector 
development and GDP per capita growth decreases in the level of economic development and 
turns insignificant for high income countries.
13 Specifically, while Bank Credit to GDP is 
                                                 
13 The fact that both Bank Credit to GDP, initial income and their interaction are insignificant, can be explained by 
the very high correlation between the three variables.  
 
 
10significant both at the 25
th and 50
th percentile of GDP per capita, it is insignificant at the 75
th 
percentile.  Overall, the relationship between Bank Credit to GDP and GDP per capita growth is 
significant at the 10% for 27 of the 43 countries in our sample.  The column 2 regression, on the 
other hand, shows that Enterprise Credit/GDP has a significant relationship with GDP per capita 




th percentiles of GDP per capita. The relationship between Household Credit 
to GDP and GDP per capita growth is insignificant, irrespective of the level of initial GDP per 
capita.   
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate that the estimation for the relationship between enterprise credit 
to GDP and growth is more precise than the estimation between overall credit to GDP and 
growth.  Specifically, we show the marginal effect of Bank Credit to GDP (Figure 3) and 
Enterprise Credit to GDP (Figure 4) on GDP per capita growth at different levels of initial GDP 
per capita, as well as the 5% level significance band.  While both relationships clearly slope 
downwards, the significance bands for Bank Credit to GDP are wider, resulting in an 
insignificant relationship with GDP per capita both at the low end of our sample in terms of 
initial economic development, as well as in the upper third.  The relationship between Enterprise 
Credit to GDP and GDP per capita growth, on the other hand, is more precisely estimated.  
Specifically, the relationship between Bank Credit to GDP and growth is significant for GDP per 
capita between 1,000 and 8,000 dollars, while the relationship between Enterprise Credit to GDP 
and growth is significant for GDP per capita of up to 16,000 dollars.  
Summarizing, the positive impact of financial development on growth has been driven by 
bank lending to enterprises rather than to households.  While borrowing by households might 
have other positive effects such as reduced consumption volatility over lifetime, there is no 
independent impact of bank lending to household on medium-term economic development.
14  
The increasing importance of household credit in total credit in high-income countries 
documented in section 2 also explains why the impact of overall bank lending on GDP per capita 
growth in these countries is insignificant. The relationship between Enterprise Credit to GDP and 
GDP per capita growth turns insignificant at higher levels of GDP per capita than the 
relationship between Bank Credit to GDP and GDP per capita growth.  The finding that credit 
                                                 
14 Jappelli and Pagano (1989) show that the excess sensitivity of consumption to current income fluctuations is 
higher in countries where consumers borrow less.  
 
 
11composition matters for the impact of finance on growth also raises the question of what drives 
credit composition across countries.  We turn to this question in the next section.  
 
4.  Enterprise vs. Household Lending – Who Gets the Credit? 
While section 3 has established a significant relationship between credit composition and GDP 
per capita growth, we now turn to country characteristics and policies that explain this variation 
across countries.  This section first discusses the explanatory variables that we will be utilizing in 
our analysis before turning to the results. 
 
4.1 Explanatory  variables 
While the theoretical literature does not provide us with any direct guidance to which variables 
should explain best the composition of credit, we can use the basic intuition of models of 
endogenous financial intermediation.
15  Financial markets and institutions arise to overcome 
market frictions, such as transaction costs and information asymmetries. The efficiency of 
financial institutions and markets, however, is also impacted by the severity of these same 
market frictions.  Transaction costs include a high fixed cost element as processing a loan entails 
certain costs that are independent of the loan size of transaction, which in turn makes loans to 
borrowers with small borrowing needs prohibitively expensive.  Similarly, high information 
barriers make loans to more opaque borrowers more difficult.  Households typically want to 
borrow small amounts of loans and limited information is available about their repayment 
prospects.  While durable consumer goods such as cars or houses in the case of mortgages are 
often provided as collateral, it is costly to enforce their recovery in case of default or political 
pressures makes it impossible.  
What does the severity of market frictions imply for the composition of credit to 
household and firm credit? To which extent can lenders use the recent technological advances to 
expand lending to households?  First, we expect a higher share of consumer lending if there is 
sufficient clientele in order to overcome scale diseconomies of lending to borrowers with small 
financing needs.  Second, the environment in which lenders work has to be conducive.  In the 
following, we will discuss different variables, organized into groups, associated with transaction 
costs and information asymmetries.  Specifically, we will consider (i) elements of economic 
                                                 
15 See Levine (2005) for an overview. 
 
 
12structure related to supply and demand of firm and household credit, (ii) elements of the 
contractual, information and macroeconomic environments shown to be important for banking 
sector development, (iii) banking market structure and (iv) bank regulatory policies. We will test 
the relationship between credit composition and different groups of country traits before 




Economic and financial structure  
We include several country traits that proxy for supply and demand factors associated with 
household vs. firm credit. A large number of similar loans can help lenders overcome 
diseconomies of scale, as can geographic concentration of borrowers and we therefore conjecture 
that the share of urban population in a country is positively associated with a higher share of 
household credit in total credit. A higher share of the population working in the informal 
economy, on the other hand, is likely to be negatively associated with household credit, as 
households working in the informal sector lack the necessary formal documentation to access 
formal banking services.  A higher share of manufacturing is also expected to be negatively 
associated with the share of household credit in total bank credit, as it might indicate a higher 
demand from enterprises. Finally, as capital markets gain in importance and thus the 
opportunities for enterprises to access alternative external finance sources rather than being 
limited to bank finance (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2001), banks are forced to look for 
alternative lending opportunities.  We therefore conjecture that the share of household credit in 
total bank lending increases as markets gain in importance vis-à-vis banks, as measured by 
financial structure, the log ratio of value traded to bank credit, using data from Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2000).  
 
                                                 
16 While we have already shown a positive relationship between the share of household credit and economic 
development, we will not include GDP per capita in our regression analysis because of multicollinearity concerns.  
First, GDP per capita is highly correlated with many other country characteristics; however, we are interested, which 
of these country traits explain the composition of credit.  Second, once controlling for other country traits, GDP per 
capita often does not enter significantly anymore. 
 
 
13Contractual, information and macroeconomic framework 
While the literature has established a robust relationship between macroeconomic stability, the 
efficiency of the contractual and information framework and bank lending, this framework might 
have a differential impact on firm and household credit with repercussions for the composition of 
overall bank credit.  A priori, the relationship between the contractual framework and the share 
of household credit is ambiguous.  On the one hand, lenders might have to rely more on the 
contractual framework for “small” borrowers than in the case of large business borrowers.  On 
the other hand, the sums at play in household credit might be too small for the lender to engage 
the legal system in the first place.  Similarly, it is a –priori not clear whether there is any 
differential effect of inflation on the composition of total private sector lending.  On the one 
hand, most consumer lending is short-term and might therefore be less affected by monetary 
instability than firm credit.  On the other hand, household credit in many countries includes 
mortgages, which are mostly at the long-end of the yield curve. When it comes to systems of 
credit information sharing, we would expect a stronger effect on household credit, as households 
are typically more informationally opaque than medium-size and large enterprises.  Consumer 
lending in both advanced and emerging markets has increasingly relied on historic information 
about borrowers and credit scoring models, both of which rely on effective credit registries and 
bureaus (Berger, Frame and Miller, 2005).  
We will use an indicator of creditor rights in and outside of bankruptcy, an indicator of 
the cost of contract enforcement and an indicator of the efficiency and breadth of credit 
information sharing, using data from the World Bank’s Doing Business database.  We will also 
include an overall measure of institutional development, as developed by Kaufman, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi (2004) and the inflation rate, as measured by the log difference of the Consumer 
Price Index.  
 
Banking sector development and structure  
We also assess whether credit composition varies with the development and structure of a 
country’s banking system.  A priori it does not seem clear whether private or government-owned 
banks and domestic or foreign-owned banks should be more inclined towards household or firm 
credit. On the one hand, foreign banks might be more inclined towards the consumer credit 
market if they can apply innovative and cost-effective technologies from their home market in 
 
 
14the host market.  On the other hand, if the cost structure is too high or important institutions, 
such as credit registries, are not in place, foreign banks might be reluctant to go down-market. 
Theory has also provided conflicting predictions on the relationship between banking market 
concentration, competitiveness and access to credit for “small” and opaque borrowers, so that it 
is a-priori not clear whether we expect a positive or negative relationship.
17  
To measure banking sector development and structure, we use Bank Credit to GDP, the 
market share of government-owned banks, the market share of foreign-owned banks and the 
market share of the largest five banks to proxy for the market structure of banking systems, 
using data from Barth, Caprio and Levine (2006).   
 
Bank regulatory policies 
Regulatory policies might impact the business environment in which banks work and thus the 
ease with which they can overcome transaction costs and risks related to lending to households.  
We therefore include several indicators capturing different dimensions of the regulatory 
framework.  We use an indicator of activity restrictions on banks that indicates to which extent 
banks cannot extend their business into insurance and capital market activity and non-financial 
sector subsidiaries. Further, entry into banking indicates restrictions on the licensing of new 
banks. Both indicators are from Barth, Caprio and Levine (2006). Finally, Heritage Foundation’s 
banking freedom indicator is an overall measure of the extent to which government does not 
interfere into banks’ business by limiting foreign bank entry, restricting banks’ activities and 
providing deposit insurance. To the extent that household lending depends on innovation and 
thus a competitive and contestable banking market, we would expect a higher share of household 
credit in economies with fewer restrictions. Finally, we consider the relationship between the 
deductibility of mortgage interest from income taxation, conjecturing that this will foster the 
demand for consumer, especially mortgage credit.  
 
                                                 
17 While theory and some empirical work suggest that market power might entice banks to invest in long-term 
relationships with small and opaque enterprises as they know that they can regain the initial investment in the 
relationship at a later stage (Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Bonaccorsi di Patti and Dell’Ariccia, 2004), other empirical 
papers point to the healthy effect of competition on availability of lending to SMEs (Cetorelli and Strahan, 2004; 




The Table 7 results show that market-based financial systems, a lower share of manufacturing, a 
higher degree of urbanization, less effective contract enforcement systems, and institutional 
development are associated with a higher share of household credit, even after controlling for an 
array of other country traits. Table 7 presents cross-country regression of the share of household 
credit in total credit on the different country characteristics discussed in the previous section.  
We first present regressions with the four separate groups of variables before testing their 
robustness in a horserace. Finally, we control for legal origin and religious composition, country 
traits that we showed are associated with the importance of enterprise and household credit 
relative to GDP.  As these are simple OLS regressions, we do not imply any causality from our 
findings.  
We start with a core group of variables that measure different demand and supply factors 
that capture the economic and financial structure. We find that more market-based financial 
systems, a higher share of manufacturing in GDP and a higher share of urban population are 
positively and significantly at the 5% level associated with a higher share of household credit in 
total credit (Column 1). A higher degree of informality in the economy, on the other hand, is 
associated with a lower share of household credit in total credit, although this result is significant 
only at the 10% level.   
The Column 2 results suggest that countries with less effective contract enforcement have 
a higher share of household credit in total credit, while there is a positive association with the 
overall level of institutional development. Neither creditor rights, nor credit information sharing 
nor inflation, however, enter significantly in this regression.  These findings suggest that while 
the importance of credit to households, as opposed to firms, increases as countries develop their 
overall institutional framework, effective contract enforcement is more relevant to firm credit.  
There are several explanations one could think of.  In the case of small consumer loans, credit to 
household might rely on the law of large numbers and less on the contractual system in the first 
place.  On the other hand, consumer loans for cars or for housing might be better secured than 
firm credit and therefore require less reliance on the formal contractual framework.  The 
existence and efficiency of credit registries are not related to a higher share of household credit.  
In unreported regressions, we also considered the separate effect of private and public credit 
registries but could not find any significant relationship either.   Macroeconomic stability – while 
 
 
16important for overall financial sector development - does not seem robustly correlated with credit 
composition, once we control for other country traits.  
The column 3 regression shows that there is no correlation of the banking market 
structure with the importance of household versus firm credit.  Neither the overall level of 
banking sector development, nor the concentration of the banking market nor the share of 
government and foreign-owned banks enter significantly at the 10% level.  The low R square of 
21% is further testimony to the little relevance that banking market structure has for the 
composition of credit. 
The column 4 regressions suggest that bank regulatory and tax variables can explain little 
of the cross-country variation in the composition of overall credit. While banking freedom enters 
positively and significantly at the 5% level and the deductibility of mortgage interest positively 
and significantly at the 10% level, none of the other regulatory variables enter significantly. The 
very low R square of 32% further underlines the little that regulatory and tax variables can 
explain in cross-country variation in credit composition.   
The column 5 regression presents a horserace of the variables that are significant at least 
at the 10% level in columns 1 through 4.  We find that the relative importance of capital markets 
vis-à-vis banks, a higher degree of urbanization, a lower share of manufacturing, better 
developed institutions and less effective contractual systems continue to predict a higher share of 
household credit, while the importance of the informal economy, banking freedom and the 
deductibility of mortgage interest lose their significance in this horserace.   
Urbanization, financial structure and the share of manufacturing are the strongest country 
correlates explaining credit composition.  To gauge the economic significance of the different 
country characteristics, we multiply the coefficients in column 5 with the respective standard 
deviations.  A change of one standard deviation in urbanization, financial structure and 
manufacturing is associated with a change in the share of household credit between 6 and 6.5 
percentage points, or approximately a third of one standard deviation of the share of household 
credit.  A one standard deviation change in contract enforcement and institutional development 
can explain a change in the share of household credit of 5.7 and 3.4 percentage points, 
respectively. Overall, the variables included in the horserace regression can explain almost two 
thirds of the overall cross-country variation in credit composition. 
 
 
17The column 6 regression shows that only financial structure, urbanization and the 
importance of the informal sector continue to significantly explain credit composition once we 
control for legal origin and religious composition, while the share of manufacturing in GDP, 
institutional development, cost of contract enforcement, banking freedom and mortgage interest 
deductibility do not enter significantly. This regression includes both endogenous country 
characteristics that change over time and historically predetermined country characteristics, thus 
ignoring the fact the latter might very well influence the former.  Both legal origin and religious 
composition explain credit composition:
18 Common law and French Civil law countries have a 
higher share of household credit, relative to the omitted category of transition economies, while 
societies with a higher share of Muslim population have a lower share of household credit. As a 
large literature explains the relationship between legal origin and religion, on the one side, and 
institutional and legal system development and bank regulatory policies, on the other side, it is 
not surprising that these endogenous variables lose their significance once we control for legal 
origin and religious composition 
The regressions in columns 7 and 8 show that urbanization, the share of manufacturing, 
banking sector development and inflation explain the share of household credit across countries 
and over time.  Here, we limit our sample to 23 countries, for which we have at least 10 years of 
data to explore what explains credit composition across time and countries.  While regression 7 
uses annual data, regression 8 uses five-year averages.  We use random effects regressions, 
consistent with the Hausman tests. These regressions confirm that a higher degree of 
urbanization and a higher share of manufacturing are associated with a higher share of household 
credit, while financial structure is not associated with variation in credit composition across 
countries and over time in this more limited sample.  Unlike in the cross-country regressions, we 
now also find that a higher level of banking development and lower inflation rates are associated 
with a higher share of household in total credit.  The differences between cross-country and 
panel regressions should not be overemphasized as we are working with different samples, and a 
large number of explanatory variables do not have time-series variation.  
 
                                                 
18 F-tests of legal origin dummies and of the religious composition variables are both significant at the 1% level.  
 
 
185. Concluding  Remarks 
This paper is a first attempt to decompose bank credit to the private sector into household and 
firm credit for a large sample of countries.  The data show that household credit is an important 
part of the lending activities of banks. In fact, in many countries, banks lend more to households 
than to firms. This observation puts into perspective the large theoretical and empirical literature 
that has studied the determinants and effects of private credit from the standpoint of firm credit 
only.  
We find that it is bank lending to enterprises, not to households, that drives the positive 
impact of financial development on economic growth.  Further, the insignificant relationship 
between household lending and growth together with the increasing share of bank lending to 
households in economically more developed countries go some way towards explaining the non-
linear finance-growth relationship.  Specifically, while total bank lending to GDP is not robustly 
linked to GDP per capita growth in high-income countries, the relationship between enterprise 
lending to GDP and economic growth is much more precisely estimated across our sample, with 
even many high-income countries showing a significant relationship.   
What country characteristics explain the credit composition? On the demand side, we 
show that the share of the informal economy, the importance of manufacturing and urbanization 
play a role, proxying for the market that lenders can rely on for household credit. Furthermore, 
competition from other financial markets influences the distribution of bank credit, as the share 
of household credit is larger in countries where capital markets are relatively more important 
than banks.  Interestingly, credit information sharing does not affect the two types of credit in 
different ways, while contract enforcement seems to be more important for firm than for 
household lending. While not significant in the cross-sectional analysis, we find that higher 
levels of banking sector development and lower inflation are associated with a higher share of 
household in total credit in a smaller panel over time. Neither banking market structure nor 
regulatory policies show any robust correlation with credit composition. These results suggest 
that the relative importance of bank lending to households and enterprises across countries is 
mostly driven by factors not immediately subject to policy decisions, but rather by differences in 
economic and financial structure.  This also puts the previous finding of an insignificant impact 
of household lending on growth in a different light.   
 
 
19Our findings justify the focus of the existing finance and growth literature on enterprise 
as opposed to household credit.  They add further evidence that financial systems foster 
economic growth by alleviating firms’ financing constraints.  And they can partly explain the 
lack of a significant finance-growth link in high-income countries. 
This exploration of enterprise versus household credit across countries is an initial 
assessment of the factors that drive credit composition and its effects.  More research is needed. 
First, expanding the existing data towards panel data sets with a longer time-series dimension 
will allow more rigorous testing of both determinants and effects of credit composition.  Second, 
relating credit composition to other financial and real sector outcomes, such as banking fragility 





Aghion, Philippe, Peter Howitt, and David Mayer-Foulkes (2005). “The Effect of Financial 
Development on Convergence: Theory and Evidence.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 120, 
173-222. 
 
Allen, Franklin, 1990. “The Market for Information and the Origin of Financial Intermediation.” 
Journal of Financial Intermediation 1, 3-30. 
 
Armendariz de Aghion, Beatriz, and Jonathan Morduch (2005). The Economics of Mirofinance. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Bacchetta, Philippe and Gerlach, Stefan (1997). “Consumption and Credit Constraints: 
International Evidence.” Journal of Monetary Economics 40, 207-238. 
 
Barth, James, Gerard Caprio, and Ross Levine (2006). “Rethinking Bank Regulation: Till Angels 
Govern”, New York and Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
 
Baum, Christopher, Mark Schaffer, and Steven Stillman (2003). “ Istrumental variables and 
GMM:  Estimation and testing.”  Stata Journal 3, 1-31. 
  
Beck, Thorsten (2006). “Creating an Efficient Financial System: Challenges in a Global 
Economy” South African Reserve Bank, Banco de Mexico, and The People's Bank of China 
(Eds.): Economic Growth, 2006. 
 
Beck, Thorsten, Asli Demirguc-Kunt, and Ross Levine (2000). “A New Database on Financial 
Development and Structure.” World Bank Economic Review, September 2000, 14, 597-605. 
 
Beck, Thorsten, Asli Demirgüc-Kunt, and Ross Levine (2006). “Bank Supervision and 
Corruption in Lending” Journal of Monetary Economics 53, 2131-63. 
 
Beck, Thorsten, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, and Vojislav Maksimovic (2005). “Financial and Legal 
Constraints to Firm Growth: Does Firm Size Matter?” Journal of Finance 60, 137-177. 
 
Beck, Thorsten, Asli Demirgüc-Kunt, and Maria Soledad Martinez Peria (2007). “Banking 
Services for Everyone?  Barriers to Bank Access and Use around the World,” World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper. 
 
Beck, Thorsten, Ross Levine, and Norman Loayza (2000). "Finance and the Sources of Growth." 
Journal of Financial Economics 58, 261-300. 
 
Beck, Thorsten and Ross Levine (2004): “Stock Markets, Banks, and Growth: Panel Evidence.” 




21Beck, Thorsten and Ross Levine (2005). “Legal Institutions and Financial Development.” In: 
Menard, C. and Shirley, M. (Eds.), Handbook of New Institutional Economics. Kluwer 
Dordrecht. 
 
Berger, Allen N., Scott Frame and Nathan Miller (2005). “Credit Scoring and the Availability, 
Price, and Risk of Small Business Credit.” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 37, 191-222. 
 
Berger, Allen, Aslı Demirgüç-Kunt, Joseph Haubrich and Ross Levine. (2004). “Bank 
Concentration and Competition: An Evolution in the Making”. Journal of Money, Banking and 
Credit 36, 433-53. 
 
Besley, D.A., E. Kuh and R.E. Welsch. (1980). Regression Diagnostics: Identifying Influential 
Data and Sources of Collinearity. New York: Wiley 
 
Bonaccorsi di Patti, Emilia and Giovanni Dell’Ariccia (2004). “Bank Competition and Firm 
Creation.“ Journal of Money, Banking and Credit 36, 225-51. 
 
Boyd, John, Ross Levine, and Bruce Smith (2001), “The Impact of Inflation on Financial Market 
Performance.” Journal of Monetary Economics 47, 221–248. 
 
Boyd, John and Edward Prescott (1986). “Financial Intermediary-Coalitions.” Journal of 
Economic Theory 38, 211-232. 
 
Buyukkarabacak, Berrak and Neven Valev (2006). “Credit Expansions and Financial Crises: The 
Roles of Household and Firm Credit” Andrew Young School of Public Policy Studies, Working 
Paper 06-55. 
 
Buyukkarabacak, Berrak and Stefan Krause (2007), “Studying the Effects of Household and 
Firm Credit: The Composition of Funds Matter” forthcoming in Economic Inquiry.  
 
Campbell, John Y. (2006). “Household Finance.” Journal of Finance 61, 1553-1604. 
 
Cetorelli, Nicola, and Philip E. Strahan (2004). “Finance as a Barrier to Entry: Bank Competition 
and Industry Structure in Local U.S. Markets.” Working Paper No. 2004-04 (January), Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago. 
 
Claessens, Stijn, Asli Demirgüc-Kunt, and Harry Huizinga (2001), “How Does Foreign Entry 
Affect the Domestic Banking Markets?” Journal of Banking and Finance, 25, 891-911. 
 
Claessens, Stijn and Luc Laeven (2004). “What Drives Bank Competition? Some International 
Evidence” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 36, 563-82. 
 
Coleman, Bent (1999). “The Impact of Group Lending in Northeast Thailand.” Journal of 




22De Gregorio, Jose (1996). “Borrowing Constraints, Human Capital Accumulation, and Growth.” 
Journal of Monetary Economics 37, 49-71. 
 
Demirguc-Kunt, Asli and Ross Levine (2001). “Bank-Based and Market-Based Financial 
Systems: Cross-Country Comparisons.” In Asli Demirguc-Kunt and Ross Levine (Eds.), 
Financial Structure and Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Comparison of Banks, Markets, 
and Development. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001. 
 
Demirgüc-Kunt, Asli, Luc Laeven, and Ross Levine (2004). “Regulations, Market Structure, 
Institutions, and the Cost of Financial Intermediation.” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 
36, 593–622. 
 
Demirgüc-Kunt, Asli, and Vojislav Maksimovic (1998). “Law, Finance and Firm Growth.” 
Journal of Finance 53, 2107-37. 
 
Diamond, Douglas W. (1984) “Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring.” Review of 
Economic Studies 51, 393-414. 
 
Djankov, Simeon, Caralee McLiesh, and Andrei Shleifer (2007). “Private Credit in 129 
Countries”, Journal of Financial Economics 84, 299-329 
 
Galor, Oded and Joseph Zeira (1993). “Income Distribution and Macroeconomics.” Review of 
Economic Studies 60, 35-52. 
 
Greenwood, Jeremy and Boyan Jovanovic (1990). “Financial Development, Growth, and the 
Distribution of Income.” Journal of Political Economy 98, 1076-1107. 
 
Harrison, Paul, Oren Sussman, and Joseph Zeira (1999). “Finance and Growth: New Evidence” 
Finance and Economics Discussion Series, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
 
Jappelli, Tullio and Marco Pagano (1989). “Aggregate Consumption and Capital Market 
Imperfections: An International Comparison.” American Economic Review 79, 1088-1105. 
 
Jappelli, Tullio and Marco Pagano (1994). “Saving, Growth, and Liquidity Constraints.” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 106, 83-109. 
 
Karlan, Dean, and Jonathan Zinman (2006). “Expanding Credit Access: Using Randomized 
Supply Decisions to Estimate the Impacts.” Yale University mimeo. 
 
Kaufman, Daniel, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi (2004). “Governance Matters III: 
Governance Indicators for 1996-2002,” World Bank Economic Review 18, 253-287. 
 
King, Robert G. and Ross Levine (1993). “Finance, Entrepreneurship, and Growth: Theory and 
Evidence.” Journal of  Monetary Economics 32, 513-42. 
 
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny (1997). 
 
 
23“Legal Determinants of External Finance.” Journal of Finance 52, 1131-1150. 
 
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny (1998). 
“Law and Finance.” Journal of Political Economy 106, 1113-1155 
  
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and  Andrei Shleifer (2006). “What Works in 
Securities Laws?” Journal of Finance 61, 1-32.  
 
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and  Andrei Shleifer (2002). “Government 
Ownership of Commercial Banks.” Journal of Finance 57, 265-301. 
 
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and  Andrei Shleifer (1999). “The Quality of 
Government.”  Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 15, 222-279. 
 
Levine, Ross. (2005), “Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence.” In Philippe Aghion and 
Stephen Durlauf (eds), Handbook of Economic Growth, The Netherlands: Elsevier Science. 
 
Love, Inessa (2003). “Financial Development and Financing Constraints: International Evidence 
from the Structural Investment Model.” Review of Financial Studies 16, 765-91. 
 
Ludvigson, Sydney (1999). “Consumption and Credit: A Model of Time-Varying Liquidity 
Constraints.” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 81, 434-447.   
 
McKinnon, Ronald I. (1973), Money and Capital in Economic Development. Washington D.C.: 
The Brookings Institution 
 
Petersen, Mitchell and Raghu Rajan. (1995). “The Effect of Credit Market Competition on 
Lending Relationships.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, 407-43. 
 
Rajan, Raghu, and Luigi Zingales (1998). “Financial Dependence and Growth.” American 
Economic Review 88, 559-587. 
Ramakrishnan, Ram and Thakor, Anjan V., 1984. “Information Reliability and A Theory of 
Financial Intermediation.”  Review of Economic Studies 51, 415-432. 
Rioja, Felix and Neven Valev (2004a). “Does One Size Fit All?  A Reexamination of the Finance 
and Growth Relationship.” Journal of Development Economics 74(2): 429-47. 
Rioja, Felix and Neven Valev (2004b). “Finance and the Sources of Growth at Various Stages of 
Economic Development.” Economic Inquiry 42(1): 127-40. 
Stulz, Rene and Rohan Williamson (2003). “ Culture, Openness, and Finance.” Journal of 
Financial Economics 70,313-349. 
 
Williamson, Steven D. (1986): “Costly Monitoring, Loan Contracts and Equilibrium Credit 
Rationing.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 102, 135-46. 
 
 
24Appendix Table A1. Enterprise credit definitions   
 
Country Variable  definitions 
Argentina  Financing by activities: credit to production, industry, construction, 
services, electricity, and commerce.  
Australia  Bank lending classified by sector: commercial lending 
Austria  Financial liabilities of non-financial corporations: short-term and long-term 
loans.  
Belgium  Loans originally granted by credit institutions to Belgian non-financial 
corporation 
Bulgaria  Commercial banks credit: credit to private enterprises, total 
Canada  Business loans from chartered banks 
Costa Rica  Credit from deposit money banks: credit to production, industry, 
construction, services, electricity, and commerce. 
Czech Republic  Banking statistics: loans: sectoral breakdown, commercial banks, non-
financial corporations 
Denmark  Bank lending to non-financial corporations. 
Egypt  Banks lending by  private sector: private businesses: local and foreign 
currency 
Estonia  Loans granted by groups of customers: commercial undertakings 
Finland  Finnish MFIs' euro-denominated loans, non-financial corporations, stock 
France  Lending by credit institutions to non-financial corporations: total 
Germany  Lending to domestic enterprises and self-employed 
persons/total/commercial banks 
Greece  Domestic MFI credit to domestic enterprises 
Hungary  Credits to enterprises and small entrepreneurs 
Iceland  Deposit money banks credit to industries 
India  Distribution of outstanding credit of scheduled commercial banks according 
to occupation: everything but personal and miscellaneous.  
Indonesia  Outstanding credit by commercial banks by group of debtor: Rupiah and 
foreign currency by private enterprises 
Ireland  Sectoral distribution of advances: All financial institutions 
Jamaica  Commercial banks analysis of loans and advances: everything but 
government and personal credit 
Japan  Loans and discounts outstanding by sector (by Type of Major 
Industries):domestically licensed banks 
Kenya  Commercial banks: distribution of credit facilities: private sector credit to 
industry, trade and business services  
Korea  Financial assets and liabilities outstanding: bank Loans: business Sector 
Latvia  Banking and monetary statistics: loans granted by credit institutions: loans 
to domestic enterprises and private persons: private enterprises 
Lithuania  Loads to Non-financial Corporations and Households: Non-financial 
Corporations 
Macedonia  Deposit Money Banks : Total Claims to Enterprises 
Malaysia  Loans by Sector: Commercial Banks: Industry, Construction, Business 
Services (Everything but Consumption Credit) 
Mexico  Credit granted by the commercial bank: Enterprises and persons with 
enterprise activity 




25New Zealand  Sector Credit: Resident NZ Claims of registered banks: Agriculture and 
Business Credit 
Pakistan  Classification of Scheduled Banks Advances by Borrower: Industry, 
Commerce, Construction (Everything but Personal and Other Credit) 
Poland  Commercial banks credit to non-financial corporations 
Portugal  Domestic credit to non-financial Corporations 
Russia  Bulletin of Banking Statistics: Credit extended to Enterprises 
Slovak Republic  Analytical Accounts of the Banking Sector: Domestic Credit: Credit to 
Enterprises 
Slovenia  Deposit Money Banks Claims on Domestics Non-Monetary sectors: Claims 
on Enterprises 
South Africa  Total Credit Extended by All Monetary Institutions Net of Household 
Credit 
Sweden  Lending to non-financial enterprises: banks 
Switzerland  Lending to companies by company size and type of loan:total 
Thailand  Commercial Bank Credit to Industry, construction, Trade and Services 
Turkey  Deposit Money Banks Credit to Enterprises 
UK  UK resident banks lending to private sector, net of lending to individuals 
USA  Commercial Banks Credit: Commercial and Industrial Loans 




26Appendix Table A2. Variables - definitions and sources 
 
Variable Definition  Source 
Bank Credit to GDP  Total outstanding claims of deposit 
money banks on private sector as 
ratio to GDP 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 
(2000) 
Enterprise Credit to GDP  Total outstanding claims of deposit 
money banks on enterprise sector as 
ratio to GDP 
See Appendix Table A1 
Household Credit to GDP  Total outstanding claims of deposit 
money banks on households as ratio 
to GDP 
See Appendix Table A1 
GDP per capita    World Development Indicators 
(WDI) 
Secondary enrolment  Share of the respective age cohort 
enrolled in secondary schools 
WDI 
Government consumption  Total govt. expenditures relative to 
GDP  
WDI 
Trade  Ratio of exports and imports to GDP  WDI 
Inflation  Average log difference in the 
Consumer Price Index over the 
sample period 
WDI 
Legal origin dummies  Origin country of each country’s 
legal system 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1999) 
Catholic, Protestant and Muslim 
population shares 
Share of population with the 
respective religious belief in total 
population 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1999) 
Financial Structure  Log ratio of stock market value 
traded to bank credit to private 
sector 
Own calculations based on Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2000) 
Urbanization  Share of population living in urban 
areas 
WDI 
Informal economy  Ratio of informal output relative to 
GDP 
WDI 
Manufacturing  Share of manufacturing value added 
in GDP 
WDI 
Institutional Development  Average of six principal component 
indicators measuring voice and 
accountability, political stability, 
absence of corruption, rule of law, 
regulatory quality and government 
effectiveness. 
Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi 
(2004) 
Creditor rights  Rights of secured creditors inside 
and outside corporate bankruptcy 
Doing Business Database 
Credit information sharing  Index of the existence and efficiency 
of credit information sharing 
systems 
Doing Business Database 
Contract enforcement costs  Average costs of enforcing a claim 
relative to a typical contract value 
Doing Business Database 
Concentration  Five-bank concentration ratio  Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2006) 
Government Bank Share  Share of majority government-
owned banks in total banking assets 
Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2006) 
Foreign Bank Share  Share of majority foreign-owned 
banks in total banking assets 




Activity restrictions  Indicator of the extent to which bank 
activities in the securities, insurance, 
and real estate markets and 
ownership and control of 
nonfinancial firms are restricted 
Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2006) 
Bank entry restrictions  Regulatory requirements for new 
banks 
Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2006) 
Mortgage deductibility  Dummy that takes value one if 
mortgage interest payments can be 
deducted from taxable income 
Own calculations 
Banking Freedom  Indicator of the absence of 
government interference in the 
banking system, such as regulatory 
restrictions, restrictions on foreign 






Low income: Per capita GDP < $3,890; Middle income $3,890 – $21,182;  
High income > $21,182. 
 
 




29Figure 3: The relationship between Bank Credit to GDP and GDP per capita growth at 
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The graph shows the marginal effect of Bank Credit to GDP across different levels of initial GDP per capita.  The 
dotted lines indicate the 95% confidence intervals.  
 
 
Figure 4: The relationship between Enterprise Credit to GDP and GDP per capita growth 
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The graph shows the marginal effect of Enterprise Credit to GDP across different levels of initial GDP per capita.  
The dotted lines indicate the 95% confidence intervals.
 
 
30Table 1: Banking sector development and credit composition across countries, 1994-2005 
Bank Credit to GDP is total claims of deposit money banks on private domestic non-financial sector as ratio to GDP. 
Enterprise Credit to GDP is total claims of deposit money banks on enterprises as ratio to GDP.  Household Credit 
to GDP is total claims of deposit money banks on households as ratio to GDP.  Enterprise and Household Credit 






Credit to GDP 
Household 





Argentina  0.207  0.087 0.120 0.419  0.581 
Australia  0.831  0.282 0.549 0.339  0.661 
Austria  0.994  0.654 0.352 0.658  0.354 
Belgium  0.756  0.319 0.437 0.422  0.578 
Bulgaria  0.206  0.147 0.076 0.712  0.367 
Canada  0.648  0.133 0.532 0.205  0.821 
Costa  Rica  0.233  0.113 0.133 0.486  0.570 
Czech Republic  0.508  0.318 0.173 0.626  0.341 
Denmark  0.853  0.129 0.724 0.151  0.849 
Egypt  0.425  0.353 0.072 0.831  0.169 
Estonia  0.285  0.180 0.114 0.630  0.398 
Finland  0.621  0.231 0.409 0.371  0.658 
France 0.854  0.340 0.512 0.398  0.599 
Germany  0.959  0.607 0.372 0.633  0.388 
Greece  0.637  0.384 0.287 0.602  0.450 
Hungary  0.234  0.190 0.042 0.811  0.178 
Iceland  0.910  0.492 0.418 0.541  0.459 
India  0.221  0.155 0.067 0.699  0.300 
Indonesia  0.282  0.169 0.081 0.601  0.287 
Ireland  1.109  0.715 0.430 0.645  0.388 
Jamaica  0.197  0.102 0.098 0.515  0.496 
Japan  1.101  0.757 0.344 0.688  0.312 
Kenya 0.255  0.200 0.053 0.783  0.209 
Korea 0.678  0.308 0.369 0.455  0.545 
Latvia 0.197  0.162 0.039 0.823  0.200 
Lithuania  0.157  0.113 0.050 0.721  0.321 
Macedonia  0.185  0.139 0.046 0.753  0.250 
Malaysia  0.971  0.856 0.102 0.882  0.105 
Mexico  0.199  0.087 0.100 0.438  0.501 
Netherlands  1.259  0.467 0.792 0.371  0.629 
New  Zealand  1.122  0.438 0.692 0.391  0.617 
Pakistan  0.225  0.176 0.049 0.781  0.219 
Poland 0.206  0.166 0.040 0.806  0.194 
Portugal  1.100  0.512 0.588 0.466  0.534 
Russia 0.141  0.115 0.033 0.816  0.235 
Slovakia  0.426  0.267 0.152 0.629  0.357 
Slovenia  0.322  0.236 0.098 0.731  0.303 
South  Africa  0.662  0.324 0.338 0.489  0.511 
Sweden  0.618  0.235 0.384 0.380  0.620 
Switzerland  1.603  0.612 0.991 0.382  0.618 
Thailand  0.907  0.728 0.179 0.803  0.197 
Turkey  0.162  0.106 0.056 0.652  0.348 






United  States  0.398  0.095 0.304 0.237  0.763 
Uruguay  0.371  0.188 0.183 0.508  0.492 
         
Average  0.589  0.310 0.282 0.571  0.434 
Standard 
deviation  0.386  0.211 0.245 0.186  0.186 
 
Table 2: Correlations 
Bank Credit to GDP is total claims of deposit money banks on private domestic non-financial sector as ratio to GDP. 
Enterprise Credit to GDP is total claims of deposit money banks on enterprises as ratio to GDP.  Household Credit 
to GDP is total claims of deposit money banks on households as ratio to GDP.  Enterprise and Household Credit 






Credit to GDP 
Household 




Credit  Share 
Enterprise Credit to GDP  0.8241***         
Household Credit to GDP  0.8719***  0.4423***       
Enterprise Credit Share  -0.3799***  0.1365  -0.7184***     
Household Credit Share  0.3740**  -0.1416  0.7196***  -0.9873***   
GDP per capita  0.6924***  0.4212***  0.7739***  -0.6234***  0.6346*** 
 Table 3: Exogenous determinants of Enterprise and Household Credit to GDP 
The regressions are the first stage regressions for the IV regression in column 5 of Table 4. Both Enterprise and 
Household Credit to GDP are in logs.  Initial income per capita is the log of real GDP per capita in 1994, secondary 
enrolment is the share of the respective age cohort enrolled in secondary schools, government consumption is total 
govt. expenditures relative to GDP, Trade is the ratio of exports and imports to GDP, Inflation is the average log 
difference in the Consumer Price Index over the sample period, the legal origin dummies indicate the origin country 
of each country’s legal system, and Catholic, Protestant and Muslim population share is the share of population with 
the respective religious belief in total population.   All regressions are run with OLS and robust standard errors are 
reported. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
Enterprise Credit to 
GDP 
Household Credit to 
GDP 
Initial income per capita  0.379  0.619 
 (0.012)**  (0.000)*** 
Secondary enrolment  -0.005  -0.001 
 (0.401)  (0.784) 
Government consumption  -0.004  0.235 
 (0.990)  (0.590) 
Trade 0.374  0.108 
 (0.020)**  (0.515) 
Inflation -1.994  -1.871 
 (0.078)*  (0.057)* 
French legal origin  0.265  0.986 
 (0.343)  (0.002)*** 
German legal origin  0.439  0.561 
 (0.246)  (0.224) 
British legal origin  0.513  0.962 
 (0.078)*  (0.003)*** 
Scandinavian legal origin  0.575  0.125 
 (0.199)  (0.757) 
Catholic population share  -0.006  -0.003 
 (0.021)**  (0.290) 
Muslim population share  0.001  -0.002 
 (0.801)  (0.577) 
Protestant population share  -0.008  0.008 
 (0.093)*  (0.152) 
Constant -5.421  -8.418 
 (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Observations 43  43 
R-squared 0.555  0.857 
    
    
F test legal origin (p-value)  0.248  0.0071 
F test religion (p-value)  0.0657  0.1391 
F test all excluded variables (p-value)  0.0181  0.0068  
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Table 4: Enterprise Credit, Household Credit and Economic Growth 
Dependent variable is the average annual growth rate of real GDP per capita. Initial income per capita is the log of 
real GDP per capita in 1994, secondary enrolment is the share of the respective age cohort enrolled in secondary 
schools, government consumption is total govt. expenditures relative to GDP, Trade is the ratio of exports and 
imports to GDP, Inflation is the average log difference in the Consumer Price Index over the sample period, Bank 
Credit to GDP is total claims of deposit money banks on private domestic non-financial sector as ratio to GDP. 
Enterprise Credit to GDP is total claims of deposit money banks on enterprises as ratio to GDP,  Household Credit 
to GDP is total claims of deposit money banks on households as ratio to GDP.  Regressions (1) – (4) are OLS 
regressions, regression (5) is IV regression, with the first stage regressions reported in Table 3. Robust standard 
errors are reported. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
Initial income per capita  -0.001 -0.000 0.002 0.001  0.001 
  (0.803) (0.852) (0.616)  (0.743) (0.760) 
Secondary  enrolment  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
  (0.683) (0.376) (0.912)  (0.398) (0.367) 
Government  consumption  -0.020 -0.021 -0.023  -0.021 -0.020 
  (0.020)** (0.014)** (0.012)**  (0.017)** (0.022)** 
Trade  0.005 0.005 0.007  0.005 0.004 
  (0.052)* (0.057)* (0.028)**  (0.086)* (0.207) 
Inflation  0.005 0.002 -0.016  -0.001  0.003 
  (0.824) (0.914) (0.493)  (0.960) (0.888) 
Bank Credit to GDP  0.008         
  (0.021)**       
Enterprise Credit to GDP    0.009    0.010  0.014 
   (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.041)** 
Household Credit to GDP      0.002  -0.002  -0.004 
    (0.636)  (0.446)  (0.351) 
Constant  0.062 0.065 0.043  0.052 0.051 
  (0.008)*** (0.002)*** (0.159) (0.074)* (0.138) 
Observations  43 43 43  43 43 
R-squared  0.334 0.404 0.263  0.415 0.393 
Sargan  test  (p-value)       0.666  
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Table 5: Enterprise Credit, Household Credit and Economic Growth – Non-linearities  
Dependent variable is the average annual growth rate of real GDP per capita. Initial income per capita is the log of 
real GDP per capita in 1994, secondary enrolment is the share of the respective age cohort enrolled in secondary 
schools, government consumption is total govt. expenditures relative to GDP, Trade is the ratio of exports and 
imports to GDP, Inflation is the average log difference in the Consumer Price Index over the sample period, Bank 
Credit to GDP is total claims of deposit money banks on private domestic non-financial sector as ratio to GDP. 
Enterprise Credit to GDP is total claims of deposit money banks on enterprises as ratio to GDP,  Household Credit 
to GDP is total claims of deposit money banks on households as ratio to GDP. All regressions are run with OLS and 
robust standard errors are reported. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  The 
effects of Bank, Enterprise and Household Credit to GDP are evaluated at the 25
th, 50
th and 75
th percentile of initial 
income per capita using lincom commands in Stata. 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Initial income per capita  -0.004  -0.003  -0.000 
 (0.381)  (0.558)  (0.939) 
Secondary enrollment  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 (0.957)  (0.947)  (0.461) 
Government consumption  -0.017  -0.017  -0.020 
 (0.073)*  (0.081)*  (0.037)** 
Trade 0.005  0.003  0.004 
 (0.165)  (0.275)  (0.205) 
Inflation 0.010  0.005  -0.001 
 (0.657)  (0.808)  (0.944) 
Bank Credit to GDP  0.046     
 (0.137)     
Bank Credit to GDP*  -0.004     
Initial income per capita  (0.200)     
Enterprise Credit to GDP    0.048  0.010 
   (0.077)*  (0.000)***
Household Credit to GDP    -0.003  0.005 
   (0.322)  (0.807) 
Enterprise Credit to GDP*    -0.004   
Initial income per capita    (0.146)   
Household Credit to GDP*      -0.001 
Initial income per capita      (0.699) 
Constant 0.092  0.087  0.067 
 (0.022)** (0.057)*  (0.273) 
Observations 43  43  43 
R-squared 0.380  0.453  0.419 
      
      
Effect on 25th percentile of initial 
income .0012**  .0143*** -0.0014 
Effect on 50th percentile of initial 
income .0079**  .0107*** -0.0025 
Effect on 75th percentile of initial 





Table 6:  Country characteristics - descriptive statistics 
Financial Structure is the log ratio of stock market value traded to bank credit to private sector. Urbanization is the 
share of population living in urban areas.  Informal economy is the ratio of informal output relative to GDP. 
Manufacturing is the share of manufacturing value added in GDP. Institutional development is the average of six 
principal component indicators measuring voice and accountability, political stability, absence of corruption, rule of 
law, regulatory quality and government effectiveness. Creditor rights is the rights of secured creditors inside and 
outside corporate bankruptcy. Credit information sharing is an index of the existence and efficiency of credit 
information sharing systems. Contract enforcement costs are the average costs of enforcing a claim relative to a 
typical contract value. Inflation is the average annual log difference of the Consumer Price Index over the sample 
period.  Bank Credit to GDP is total claims of deposit money banks on private domestic non-financial sector as ratio 
to GDP. Concentration is the five-bank concentration ratio. Government and foreign bank shares are the share of 
majority government or foreign-owned banks in total banking assets. Activity restrictions is an indicator of the 
extent to which bank activities in the securities, insurance, and real estate markets and ownership and control of 
nonfinancial firms are restricted. Bank entry restrictions are the regulatory requirements for new banks. Mortgage 
deductibility is a dummy that takes value one if mortgage interest payments can be deducted from taxable income. 
Banking freedom indicates the absence of government interference in the banking system, such as regulatory 
restrictions, restrictions on foreign bank entry and deposit insurance.  
 
Variable Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Maximum Minimum 
Financial  Structure    0.61 0.77 4.17 0.00 
Urbanization    65.71 17.96 97.15 20.02 
Informal  economy 24.93 10.97 52.6  8.8 
Manufacturing  19.88 4.88  31.17 11.43 
Institutional  development  0.76 0.82 1.91 -0.87 
Creditor  rights  5.61 2.17 10  1 
Credit information sharing   4.41  1.56  6  0 
Contract  enforcement  cost  17.75 19.37 126.5 4.8 
Inflation  0.06 0.08 0.44 0.00 
Bank Credit to GDP  0.60  0.38  1.6  0.14 
Concentration  0.67 0.18 1  0.30 
Government bank share  19.41  23.07  80  0 
Foreign  bank  share  15.60 24.01 99  0 
Activity  restrictions  8.68 2.44 14  4 
Bank entry restrictions  7.13  1.28  8  2 
Mortgage deductibility   0.14  0.35  1  0 
Banking  freedom  63.00 16.63 90  30   37
Table 7: What explains the share of household credit in total credit across countries? 
The dependent is the share of household credit in total credit. The explanatory variables are defined in Tables 3 and 
6. Column (1)-(6) regressions are run with OLS and regressions (7) and (8) with random effects. Robust standard 
errors are reported. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.   
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6)  (7) (8) 
Financial  Structure  0.049      0.065  0.047  -0.002  -0.006 
  (0.026)**      (0.006)***  (0.072)*  (0.722)  (0.558) 
Urbanization  0.216      0.162  0.192  0.190  0.389 
  (0.000)***      (0.022)**  (0.014)**  (0.010)**  (0.000)*** 
Manufacturing  -0.192      -0.247  -0.099  -0.104  -0.214 
  (0.018)**      (0.004)***  (0.275)  (0.060)*  (0.005)*** 
Informal  economy -0.006      -0.000  -0.004    
  (0.010)***      (0.924)  (0.042)**    
Institutional  development    0.181    0.133  -0.031    
    (0.000)***    (0.021)**  (0.563)    
Creditor  rights    -0.014          
    (0.230)          
Enforcement  costs   0.002    0.003  0.000    
    (0.007)***    (0.007)***  (0.870)    
Credit information sharing    -0.001            
    (0.928)          
Inflation    -0.032        -0.004  -0.002 
    (0.906)        (0.000)***  (0.028)** 
Bank credit to GDP      0.067        0.094  0.052 
     (0.208)       (0.000)***  (0.027)** 
Concentration    0.149          
     (0.473)          
Govt. bank share      -0.002          
     (0.317)          
Foreign bank share      -0.000          
     (0.757)          
Banking freedom        0.004  -0.000  0.000    
       (0.032)**  (0.972)  (0.790)    
Mortgage deductibility        0.139  -0.008  -0.009    
       (0.078)*  (0.900)  (0.889)    
Activity Restrictions        -0.006        
       (0.629)        
Entry restrictions        -0.001        
       (0.969)        
German legal origin            0.086    
          (0.340)    
British legal origin            0.181    
          (0.014)**    
French legal origin            0.209    
          (0.001)***    
Scandinavian legal origin            0.179    
          (0.252)    
Protestant population share            0.002    
          (0.148)    
Catholic population share            0.001    
          (0.326)    
Muslim population share            -0.002    
          (0.023)**    
Constant 0.233  0.339  0.424  0.197 0.313  -0.177  -0.061  -0.472 
 (0.384)  (0.000)***  (0.015)**  (0.356)  (0.278) (0.628)  (0.865)  (0.218) 
Observations  42  45  38 38 42  42  259  77 
Countries  42  45  38 38 42  42  23  23 
R-squared  0.549  0.435  0.213 0.319 0.635  0.819    
 
 